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Within the past 25 years, climate change has been a constant and often polarized topic of 
discussion within the scientific, academic, and political communities. This thesis provides a 
holistic review of the effects of climate change as it pertains to U.S. military installations and the 
ability of the military to project force abroad. Recent climatic events and assessments conducted 
by the Department of Defense have pegged climate change as a persistent threat to the structural 
integrity and operational capacity of military bases at home and abroad. Politically, there is a 
disconnect between this reality and an administration that wants to prioritize global force 
projection while ignoring climate change, one of the most salient threats to its military.  
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 1 
Introduction 
On June 2017, the United States withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord. Later that year 
climate change was removed from the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). These decisions 
were in line with President Donald Trump’s climate change denialism. It sent a clear message 
that climate change will not be a determinant of political decisions under the Trump 
administration and it provided a prime example of how the politics of climate change can trump 
both scientific proof and subject matter expert suggestions.  
This thesis conducts an assessment of the observed and potential fallout from the denial 
of climate change and the unwillingness to recognize and act on its effects. The focus is on the 
effects of climate change on military installations and how these effects impact national security 
and military force projection. By analyzing the destructive potential that climate change can have 
on military installations, I argue that: a) Climate change is a salient concern for the military since 
its damaging effects on military installations are already being observed and the threats they pose 
are directly linked to climate-driven factors, and b) Climate change denialism is detrimental for 
the United States since disruption in vital installations can lead to degraded national security and 
weakened global force projection.  
The following sections of the paper review the academic literature and DoD-led research 
on climate change and security as it pertains to a) exacerbating violent conflict, b) disrupting 
military operations, and c) degrading military installations. Then, case studies are presented to 
highlight the damage that climate change can have on military installations and on the crucial 
national security functions that they perform. To conclude, current Trump Administration 
policies are collectively assessed to highlight the disconnect that exists between an apolitical  
military force’s needs and the heavily politicized imperatives that dictate its actions.  
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Climate Change and Security: Literature Review 
This section of the thesis conducts a literature review on three aspects of climate security 
research that are pertinent to my thesis: a) academic literature that explores how a rapidly 
changing climate can exacerbate violent conflict, b) military assessments on how climate change 
adaptation behaviours have the potential to compromise national security and alter the nature, 
extent, or frequency of global military operations, and c) assessments of how climate change can 
disrupt national security and U.S. force projection through its damaging effects on U.S. military 
installations.  
I. Violent Conflict 
Research examining the link between climate change and conflict began in 1987 when a 
report released by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) warned 
that resource scarcity and stagnated economic development brought about by environmental 
degradation can result in widespread violent conflict (Brundtland et al. 1987; Barnett 2003). 
Following the red flags raised by the WCED report, environmental matters began to make their 
way into the global political agenda and the conventional understanding of stability was 
reevaluated to include environmental issues as a salient factor (Dalby 1992). 
By the 1990s, the relationship between climate change and violent conflict began to gain 
momentum both as a cause of concern for international relations and as a valid field of academic 
study. Initial studies investigated the correlation between rapid and increasingly variable climatic  
change and its potential to cause or influence acute conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1991). The studies 
found that environmental degradation was a factor in violent conflict but isolating and 
quantifying the degree that environmental factors influence conflict was inherently difficult due 
to the myriad political, social, and spatio-temporal factors that are simultaneously at play in most 
acute conflicts and since most affected areas already had a pre-existing history of abuse and 
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instability caused by socioeconomic and political factors (Baechler 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999, 
1991).  
Recent studies on climate change driven violent conflict have taken a more 
comprehensive approach by factoring in second-order effects of climate variabilities. Research 
methods and questions shifted focus towards climate change’s “adverse knock-on consequences 
for agricultural productivity, economic activity, and food security” as a more comprehensive 
method of establishing connections between climate change, instability, and conflict (McDonald 
2013; Buhaug 2016). For example, reduced rainfall and increased temperatures adversely reduce 
agricultural production which in turn drives resource scarcity and increased food prices resulting 
in widespread poverty, public unrest, and increased potential for conflict (Barnett and Adger 
2007; Hendrix and Haggard 2012).  
Quantitative research has also been conducted to analyze connections between extreme 
climate variabilities and violent conflict. Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) evaluated 60 primary 
studies and 45 distinct conflict datasets to infer a causal relationship between climate variability 
and violent conflict. Their research indicated that deviations from normal temperature and 
precipitation levels systematically led to increased incidence of conflict. Each 1 standard 
deviation change towards warmer climate or towards more extreme rainfall levels resulted in  
increased frequency of interpersonal violence by 4% and intergroup conflict by 14% (median 
estimates). The meta-analysis did not claim that climate change is the sole or even primary cause 
of conflict but it did show that extreme climate variations have a substantial influence on the 
frequency of violent conflict (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013).  
The role of climate change as a secondary factor for violent conflict is widely supported 
by academic research and looking at the climate change and violent conflict nexus holistically 
shows that factors that increase the risk of violent armed conflicts are heavily impacted by the 
 4 
effects of climate change (Adger et al. 2014). However, academic studies have not isolated a 
robust and direct causal relationship between climate change and violent conflict (Koubi 2019). 
The general consensus remains that politically weak, economically unstable, and agriculture 
dependent regions are the most vulnerable to the conflict-inducing effects of climate change 
since they are not capable of absorbing disruptions to the social, political, and economic norms 
(Reuveny 2007; Koubi 2019). Therefore, political geographers like Halvard Buhaug have begun 
to reframe the analysis by investigating threats to economic security and societal stability instead 
of focusing on discussions of “climate wars” (Buhaug 2016). Since the most probable causal link 
between climate change and violent conflict is with regards to its effect in exacerbating conflict 
in unstable regions, a growing number of academic studies are contending that improving 
economic and political resilience might be the best way to prevent the violent conflict inducing 
effects of climate change (Buhaug 2016). 
II. Climate Security Implications for U.S. Military Operations: 
The United States military has also been conducting studies on climate security, however, 
by nature of their organizational purpose they intentionally focus on effects of climate change  
that have the potential to compromise national security or alter the nature, extent, or frequency of 
global military operations. A landmark 2007 publication by the Center for Naval Analysis 
classified climate change as a “threat multiplier” for US national security and global military 
operations (CNA 2007), the 2010 U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List called to 
“assess potential impact of global climate change on U.S. national security” (U.S. Army War 
College 2010), and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2010 NSS both identified 
“climate change as likely to trigger outcomes that will threaten U.S. security” (Department of 
Defense 2010; Office of the President 2010; McElroy and Baker 2012). The increasing gravity of 
climate change as a military concern is echoed in Former US Secretary of Defense James 
 5 
Matthis’ confirmation statement where he alluded to how “climate change is impacting stability 
in areas of the world where [U.S.] troops are operating [in]” (Doherty 2017).   
A 2012 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded Harvard study warned that “the 
national security context will change” in response to climate-driven water, energy, and food 
insecurities around the world and that the U.S. needs to be vigilant about “the behavior of nations 
in their attempts to mitigate or adapt to the effects of changing [climate] extremes, and [its] 
impacts on social, economic, and political well-being” (McElroy and Baker 2012; Lippert 2016). 
The Harvard study contextualizes climate change as a valid challenge for U.S. national security 
because of its influence on the decisions made by nations and individuals coping with scarcities 
and unpredictabilities produced by a rapidly changing climate.  
A report by the German think tank Adelphi found that climate change “creates an 
environment where terrorism can thrive” through more legitimized influence and through  
increased recruiting capabilities (Lukas and Rüttinger 2016). Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) 
utilize situations created by climate change to bolster their legitimacy by gaining control of 
supply and creating demand for increasingly scarce natural resources such as water or arable 
land. These groups can then gain favor from the local populace by offering alternative, more 
seemingly stable livelihoods and economic incentives and/or by responding to unheard socio-
economic and political grievances (Lukas and Rüttinger 2016).   
Limited access to resources and livelihood can also “diminish the opportunity costs of 
conflict participation, increase costs of non-participation, and heighten anti-state grievances” 
within regions that heavily rely on climate and weather consistency for agricultural production 
(Reuveny 2007; Devlin and Hendrix 2014; Eastin 2018). This results in increased NSAG 
recruitment since they offer economic incentives to a predominantly young male population with 
otherwise limited alternatives for sustainable livelihood (Lukas and Rüttinger 2016). Climate 
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change exacerbates this dynamic by further reducing the availability of vital resources and, as 
documented in the Adelphi study, “the scarcer resources become, the more power is given to 
those who control them” (Lukas and Rüttinger 2016). 
The threat of declining resources can also extend beyond NSAG actions and into the 
realm of interstate conflict wherein the threat of militarized action is present among multiple 
legitimate governing bodies due to precipitation variability resulting in uncertain levels of shared 
water resources. To a degree, this presents a more complex problem since there are no clear 
enemies and mediating peace means attempting to manufacture an irreplaceable natural resource 
such as water or land. According to The U.S. National Intelligence Council “serious water 
shortages will, over the medium term, destabilize already tense bilateral relationships” (U.S.  
National Intelligence Council 2012; Devlin and Hendrix 2014).  
Though a majority of studies only identify climate change as a peripheral influencer, its 
ability to exacerbate factors that are commonly associated with increased terrorist activities and 
resource-driven interstate conflict is sufficient reason for the U.S. military to take notice of 
climate change as a potential threat to regional stability. The U.S. military is a pre-emptive entity 
so it views the prevention of conflict as a vital component for continued U.S. economic 
prosperity and international political cooperation. As stated in a 2012 National Intelligence 
Council report, “[during] the next 10 years, many countries important to the United States will 
experience water problems — shortages, poor water quality, or floods — that will risk instability 
and state failure, increase regional tensions, and distract them from working with the United 
States on important US policy objectives” (U.S. National Intelligence Council 2012).  
Climate change has broad overreaching effects and as stated by Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Dunford, one of the main facets of climate change concern is “the 
category of sources of conflict around the world and things [the military] have to respond to” 
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(Department of Defense 2019).  In addition to increased likelihood of terrorism and armed 
conflict, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also warns that “global environmental and 
ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, 
economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond” (Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence 2019). For military operations, this means that a shift can happen from primarily 
dealing with armed conflicts to having the additional burden of simultaneously responding to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Increased extreme weather catastrophes across the 
globe will demand more immediate and continuous support over a more dispersed area of  
operations. Displacement and mass migrations will divert the military’s attention from external 
overseas operations into internal border security engagements (Smith 2007). These anticipated 
climate change effects can overwhelm current military capabilities by forcing it to continuously 
respond to simultaneous events over geographically dispersed regions (Department of Defense 
2014). 
III. Climate Change Effects on Military Infrastructure and Operations 
The effects of climate change on violent conflict and global military operations are well-
explored and well-documented areas of environmental security discourse. However, the impacts 
of climate change on violent conflict is supplemental at best and its direct effects on military 
missions are primarily speculative. That being said, I argue that the impacts of climate change on 
military installations pose a greater threat to military operations since damaging effects directly 
linked to climate change are already being observed. This section conducts a historical review of 
how climate change came to be seen as a threat to military installations as well as the steps that 
the DoD has taken to adapt to or mitigate those disruptive effects. 
In 1990, a U.S. Naval War College paper warned against the potential negative effects of 
sea level rise and oceanic warming on the Navy’s fixed land structures. The paper speculated that 
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Naval bases in coastal regions and in low lying areas are susceptible to flooding and 
infrastructure damage due to rising sea levels and extreme weather events (Kelley 1990). This 
was an insightful and informative paper for civil engineers and base planners but the relative 
uncertainty surrounding climate change and the lack of concrete evidence did not warrant any 
substantial response at the time.  
Nearly two decades later, towards the end of President George W. Bush’s second term,  
the military’s climate change concerns began to expand more seriously and with more political 
backing into the operational readiness and warfighting capabilities at the installation level. In 
2008, the DoD Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) was 
“green-lighted to move into the area of climate change-related research as it affected DoD 
[installation level] interests” (Hall 2015). Since that administrative mandate was established, the 
Department of Defense, Congress, Senate, and political think-tanks have all initiated studies and 
established guidelines to assess, mitigate, and/or adapt to harmful effects of a changing climate 
on military built infrastructures, training tempo, and operational capabilities both in foreign and 
domestic training sites.  
In 2010, Climate Change was added into the National Security Strategy as a salient 
concern for continued global stability and national security. This has prompted the military to 
take a more serious stance on national security issues that can arise from a rapidly changing 
climate. The Navy created its own Climate Change Roadmap where it recognized effects of 
climate change on military installation resilience, water resource management, and sea level rise 
(“U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap” 2010). The Army War College also called for the 
assessment of “potential impact of global climate change on U.S. national security” in its Key 
Strategic Issues List (U.S. Army War College 2010) and the DoD established a Climate Change 
Adaptation Workgroup tasked with developing a DoD-wide climate change adaptation strategy.  
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The increased military and political imperative to address the harmful effects of climate 
change on military bases resulted in comprehensive analysis, concrete case studies, and readily 
actionable data. The DoD concluded that “[US military] coastal installations are vulnerable to 
rising sea levels and increased flooding, while droughts, wildfires, and more extreme  
temperatures could threaten many of [the military’s] training activities” (Department of Defense 
2014). More pronounced hot and cold temperatures can also place added strain on the energy 
infrastructure due to the increased heating and/or cooling demands of installation infrastructures 
(SERDP 2013). Sea level rise, desertification, and more frequent temperature extremes can 
reduce the availability of suitable specialized training sites. Training activities such as 
amphibious beach landing operations, prolonged outdoor combat simulations, and aviation 
maneuver exercises would have to be delayed, moved to more suitable locations, or postponed 
indefinitely (USACE Engineer Research Development Center 2013; The Center for Climate and 
Security 2016).  
In a 2013 High Level Assessment conducted by the U.S. Army, they concluded that at the 
highest or intermediate levels of climate change impact, Army installations “may no longer be 
able to support current and future mission requirements” or they would “require adaptive actions 
to prevent, remediate, or repair impacts, which could carry high costs and require significant 
time for planning and implementation” (USACE Engineer Research Development Center 2013). 
A 2019, DoD-led Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense 
surveyed 79 military and national security critical installations and they found that, two-thirds of 
the bases are “vulnerable to current or future recurrent flooding” and approximately half of the 
bases are “vulnerable to current and future” droughts and wildfires (Department of Defense 
2019).   
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To further improve its scope and to develop diverse perspectives,the DoD also 
participated in climate change related scientific research by funding the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to study 
topics and locations that can aid in preparation, adaptation, and mitigation of climate change 
effects (Council 2001; Storlazzi, Elias, and Berkowitz 2015; Storlazzi et al. 2018). The DoD was 
also an active participant in the advisory committee conducting the National Climate Assessment 
(NCA) (USACE Engineer Research Development Center 2013). The NCA is the principal report 
that analyzes present and future impacts of climate change on the United States. In addition to 
conducting assessments, the DoD also established sustainability measures to “advance the 
mission by ensuring the longevity of critical resources” while proactively reducing the military 
infrastructure’s impact on the environment and reducing the DoD’s reliance on non-renewable 
sources of energy (Department of Defense 2016).  
Case Studies 
 The aforementioned assessments, guidelines, and studies show the degree of concern that 
the DoD has placed on climate change effects for military bases. This section highlights exactly 
why these are valid concerns through 6 case studies that show varying degrees of disruption that 
have resulted from sea-level rise, increased temperatures, and extreme weather events; all effects 
linked to climate change. I selected these case studies to serve as empirical backing for my 
argument due to their immediate effects on military infrastructures but more importantly because 
of the broader roles these facilities and operations play in preserving U.S. national security and 
strengthening U.S. global force projection. 
I. Sea-level Rise:  
Sea-level rise has been one of the most widely studied and frequently observed 
byproducts of climate change. Both private research groups and government-led panels have  
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agreed that sea-level rise and the higher risk of storm surge that accompanies it are measurable 
and observable byproducts of a changing climate (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1991; 
Gregory et al. 2007; Church et al. 2013; Change (IPCC) 2013; IPCC 2018). The DoD has also 
classified sea-level rise as a current and upcoming threat for both national and global military 
operations at coastal sites. In a 2019 government-mandated study, the DoD reported that two-
thirds of the bases that it assessed were vulnerable to present and/or future flooding (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 2019). The Strategic 
Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) which is the DoD’s primary 
environmental science research program published a report stating “sea level rise to be a 
significant and pervasive threat multiplier to mission sustainability, significantly increasing 
loadings on built infrastructure, and dramatically increasing risks to system capabilities and 
service provisioning.” (Burks-Copes et al. 2014). Rising sea levels and increasingly pervasive 
storm surges will cause degradation of coastal infrastructure which would reduce available 
training sites for littoral and shore training; damage vital ship docking, repair, and storage 
infrastructures; and impact logistical supply chains via shipping delays and cancellations 
(USACE Engineer Research Development Center 2013; GAO 2014; The Center for Climate and 
Security 2016; Kusnetz 2017).  
These effects can have further second and third order byproducts. Docking and 
deployment time for submarines, ships, and aircraft carriers can be adversely affected by flooded 
or damaged piers and docking sites. Fiscal spending priorities will be shifted from force 
readiness and technological research & development into base repair, floodwall construction, and 
land reclamation operations. Flooded road networks can make vital parts of the base inaccessible 
to personnel for extended periods of time (SERDP 2013). Training events such as amphibious 
assault, coastal corridor maneuvers, and beach landing simulations, which require specific 
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training environments, would need to be reassessed due to loss of available coastal training sites 
and degradation of simulated training environments (SERDP 2013).  
 The aforementioned effects of sea-level rise are widespread in both domestic and 
international military sites. However, there are specific sites that are affected more heavily than 
others and in which damage to operational capacity will be more detrimental to national security 
due to the strategic roles they play in maintaining American global military dominance. The 
following section will highlight two case studies: Naval Station Norfolk, the largest naval base in 
the world and the center of operations for the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet (Kusnetz 2017), and the 
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense (RRBMD) site located on the Kwajalein Atoll in the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, a primary missile testing asset and home to Asia-focused 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) detectors (The Center for Climate and Security 2016). 
A. Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia 
 Naval Station Norfolk is the center of operations for all Atlantic naval operations. 
However, it is also one of the most telling case studies on the effects of sea-level rise within 
coastal military installations. Over the past 100 years, the naval base has experienced a 1.5-foot 
sea-level rise (Kusnetz 2017) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has warned that 
an additional 1.5 feet of sea-level rise would represent a “tipping point” for the base (Burks-
Copes et al. 2014). A 2013 state-commissioned report found that Norfolk Naval Station and its 
surrounding areas are predicted to experience that amount of sea-level rise within the next  
20 to 50 years (Virginia Institute of Marine Science 2013).  A NASA-led study also concluded 
that Norfolk Naval Base has “one of the highest rates of relative sea level rise” along the entire 
East Coast—about two inches every decade (Bekaert et al. 2017). In addition, the Union of 
Concerned Scientists conducted an independent analysis and found that an additional 1.4 feet of 
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sea-level rise would result in low-lying areas flooding up to 20 times a year and spending 10 
percent of the year fully submerged underwater (Spanger-Siegfried et al. 2016; Kusnetz 2017).  
 
Figure 1: Anticipated flooding during storms in Norfolk Naval Base with a 1.5m sea-level rise.  
Source: U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center1 
 
The current extent of sea-level rise already has observable effects on both mission-critical 
and routine base operations. One of the most pressing and costly issues in the base is the inability 
of piers to service naval ships during periods of high tides. The current high tide sea-levels have 
made it impossible to use the older single-deck piers since they are flooded with ocean water 
making them inaccessible to personnel. Electrical power is also shut off to these piers in order to 
prevent short-circuiting the electrical grid. Single deck piers have been replaced with higher 
                                               
1https://insideclimatenews.org/news/10252017/military-norfolk-naval-base-flooding-climate-change-sea-level-
global-warming-virginia 
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double deck piers in order to continue operations during high tides, however, due to budgetary 
and operational constraints the base has only been able to replace 4 of the 12 piers; that means 
that during high tides, the docking, repair, and resupply piers in the largest naval base in the 
world is only operating at 33% capacity. Replacement cost for these piers is valued at $150-$200 
million each making it fiscally difficult to retrofit and update all piers (Kusnetz 2017). The Navy 
has drafted plans to spend $21 billion over 20 years to update its aging docks, however, it will be 
a challenge to simultaneously upgrade the docks and conduct routine operations (Eckstein 2018). 
The reduction in pier operating capacity has detrimental and overreaching consequences for 
naval power projection in the Atlantic since a majority of aircraft carriers, submarines, and 
warships are stationed, serviced, and resupplied at Naval Station Norfolk.  
 In addition to direct mission impacts, routine tasks needed to maintain and operate the 
base will also be heavily affected by sea-level rise. The probability and severity of flooding from 
precipitation events are projected to increase due to higher ocean levels blocking storm drain 
pipes and reducing their ability to efficiently redirect rainwater into the ocean. As a result, road 
networks and housing facilities of personnel stationed in Naval Station Norfolk will likely 
experience more severe and frequent flooding. The integrity of power and communications grids  
throughout the immediate vicinity of the base will also be affected by annual flooding events 
(Kusnetz 2017). All of these peripheral effects of sea-level rise, while not directly affecting 
military infrastructure and operations, will place an unnecessary mental and emotional burden on 
military service members.  
B. Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, Kwajalein Atoll 
 For more than a century, small chains of islands have been utilized by the United States 
military as a means of extending its influence by monitoring remote allies and enemies, 
lightening the logistical load of overseas operations, and utilizing remote locations for nuclear 
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and ballistic missile testing and detection (Hecht 2011; Vine 2015; Bélanger and Arroyo 2016). 
Sea-level rise is an imminent threat for a majority of U.S. remote island installations but Ronald 
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense (RRBMD) Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll warrants a closer look 
due to the severity of damage that sea level rise poses for the atoll and due to its importance in 
maintaining U.S. national security (The Center for Climate and Security 2016). It’s geographical 
location at the heart of the Pacific and as a midway point between the United States mainland 
and countries with nuclear capabilities such as Russia, China, and North Korea make it a pivotal 
staging post for missile detection scanners and air-defense artillery. Future plans also include the 
addition of a $1 billion “Space Fence” radar system which would provide the U.S. Air Force 
with “detection, tracking, and accurate measurement of space objects” (Lockheed Martin n.d.; 
Kusnetz 2018). The addition of this infrastructure would add to Kwajalein Atoll’s already 
technology-dense landscape and increase its importance as a strategic “territorial bulwark” (The 
Center for Climate and Security 2016). 
A 2018 study conducted in Roi-Namur, a contingent of the RRBMD Test Site, found that 
wave-driven run-up, a phenomenon wherein incident waves cause a “vertical excursion of the 
instantaneous shoreline”, will cause consistent sea-water intrusion of potable groundwater 
resources (Oberle, Swarzenski, and Storlazzi 2017; Buckley et al. 2018). If sea-level increases by 
0.4 meters higher than present levels, storm surges can inundate the islands to a degree that 
groundwater will be non-potable year round (Storlazzi et al. 2017, 2018). Under the most severe 
ice sheet collapse scenarios (RCP8.5+), the 0.4-meter mark will be reached before 2035. At 1 
meter higher than present sea-level, a majority of Kwajalein Atoll will be flooded at least once a 
year (Storlazzi et al. 2017, 2018). Although the studies were conducted specifically for Roi-
Namur, other military assets located in atolls (i.e. Diego Garcia and Wake Island) and remote 
low-lying islands (i.e. Hawaii) are equally vulnerable to the same threats (see Fig. 2).  
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Figure 2: Location of military installations in the Pacific  
(Kwajalein Atoll located within Republic of Marshall Islands) 
Source: The Center for Climate and Security2 
 
The impending inhabitability and lack of mobility within island installations is an issue 
for operational capacity and personnel safety. However, due to the location and type of these 
remote island bases, national security interests such as continued defense against hostile 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) will also be challenged. Ground based missile defense 
systems rely on a complicated network of radars and satellites in order to successfully track and 
intercept hostile projectiles. This system operates on information that is continuously relayed 
through a series of sensors so a disruption in this chain can hugely reduce a defense missile’s 
accuracy and effectiveness (Union of Concerned Scientists n.d.)(Figure 3). Early stage ICBM 
detection and interception is contingent upon continued operations of forward-located bases like 
                                               
2https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/center-for-climate-and-security_military-expert-panel-
report2.pdf 
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RRBMD; therefore, a reduction in operational capacity in sites like RRBMD will heavily 
degrade U.S. capabilities to defend against ICBMS which are potentially the most damaging 
single-form threat that the U.S. is currently facing. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Process of detection and interception of hostile projectile 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists3 
 
II. Increasing Temperatures 
Increasing global temperatures have been one of the most steadily observed and well-
documented effects of climate change (Oreskes 2004; Hansen et al. 2010; Blunden and Arndt 
2016; IPCC 2018). Starting in 1975, the rate of global mean temperature increase has doubled 
from previous century estimates (see Fig. 4) (Blunden et al. 2018). This steady increase in 
temperature has brought a host of problems for military installations located in heavily impacted 
regions. This section of the analysis will be looking at loss of training capabilities from extreme 
heat and the degradation of vital military infrastructure in Alaska. 
                                               
3 https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/missile-defense/how-gmd-missile-defense-works 
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________________Figure 4: History of global surface temperature since 1880 
Source: National Climatic Data Center4 
A. Land-Based Training and Operations 
United States focused research have projected annual average surface air temperature 
increases between 2.7° and 8.6°F  through the year 2100 for multiple greenhouse-gas emission 
scenarios (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014; Weatherly and Rosenbaum 2017). 
Increasing temperatures are a prime concern for the military since extreme heat will disrupt 
training events by altering its intensity, frequency, type, and location (USACE Engineer 
Research Development Center 2013; Department of Defense 2014; Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 2019).  
In all branches of the U.S. military, a “black flag” or suspended outdoor training category 
is issued when the Wet-Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) exceeds 90°. Unlike direct 
temperature measurements, the WBGT index measures “air temperature, humidity, and solar 
                                               
4 https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/global/time-series 
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exposure” (Sawka et al. 2003; Weatherly and Rosenbaum 2017). The addition of humidity into 
the measurement creates an uneven forecast for WBGT change over the continental United 
States. Using the most severe greenhouse gas-emission scenarios (RCP 8.5+),  regions in the 
humid southeast, where a majority of land and air-based military training and testing are 
conducted, will be susceptible to increased frequency of high WBGT days (USACE Engineer 
Research Development Center 2013; Weatherly and Rosenbaum 2017). Increases in WBGT can 
be extremely detrimental to productivity and outdoor training since current military guidelines 
propose that “all strenuous, non-essential outdoor activity is to be halted for everyone” when a 
black flag warning is issued (Sawka et al. 2003). In situations where work is necessary,  black 
flag categories require 50 minutes of rest for every 10 minutes of work. This can be highly 
problematic for meeting outdoor training objectives since black flag days cause an 80% loss of 
productivity (Dunne, Stouffer, and John 2013; USACE Engineer Research Development Center 
2013; Department of Defense 2014). In a time when geopolitical tensions are high and 
international relations are volatile, the military has repeatedly expressed that having fully-
trained, deployment capable units is the top priority (Kimmons 2019). However, the projected 
increase in black flag days will adversely affect short and long term training targets resulting in 
delayed readiness timelines and reduced deployability of military personnel (Department of 
Defense 2014).  
Aside from extensive training restrictions, increasing temperatures are also altering the 
physical training environment causing loss, degradation, or restriction of access to existing 
training lands and simulated environments (USACE Engineer Research Development Center 
2013; Department of Defense 2014; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment 2019). Realistic training environments and weapons usage, which are vital to 
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maintaining military readiness, will also be affected by byproducts of increasing temperatures. 
Drought and desertification have made training sites susceptible to wildfires making them 
unsuitable for use of military weaponry and combustive munitions such as tracer rounds, 
mortars, and artillery (USACE Engineer Research Development Center 2013; Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 2019). Training delays and 
restrictions are consistently experienced in areas where these simulations have sparked wildfires 
prompting personnel to relocate or postpone training.  
Vital vehicle, weaponry, and infrastructure will also be affected by the effects of 
increasing temperatures. Low-level rotary aircraft will experience reduced lift capacity due to 
extremely high surface air temperatures affecting both simulated training operations and 
emergency medical evacuations in remote desert environments (USACE Engineer Research 
Development Center 2013). Electronic and mechanical weaponry systems will also need to be 
altered for extended exposure to extremely high temperatures (USACE Engineer Research 
Development Center 2013). Anticipated increase in demand for cooling within buildings will 
also result in financial costs from higher electricity consumption, retrofitting of existing 
buildings for better insulation and energy efficiency, and expansion of the electric grid to 
accommodate increased demands.  
B. Alaska 
Temperature increases are projected to occur at an even greater degree in higher latitudes 
such as Alaska due to Arctic amplification, a phenomenon primarily caused by melting sea ice 
resulting in lower albedo and higher heat absorption (Screen and Simmonds 2010; Cohen, 
Pfeiffer, and Francis 2018). This higher than normal rate of temperature rise, projected to be 2 to 
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3 times higher than the global average, will result in coastal erosion, intensified storm effects, sea 
ice retreat, and permafrost thawing in areas where key military bases are located (SERDP 2012). 
Infrastructure built in Alaska were planned and created with stable and consistent 
permafrost levels in mind, however, rapidly increasing temperature levels have resulted in 
unprecedented permafrost thawing. Permafrost extent varies from sporadic & discontinuous, 
where small to medium concentrations of permafrost are found underground serving as a glue to 
hold together soil components, to continuous, where permafrost constitutes a majority of solid 
foundation that structures are built upon (see Fig. 5). When sporadic or discontinuous permafrost 
melts, the ground begins to soften and warp creating uneven, pliable landscapes out of formerly 
flat and solid ground. When continuous permafrost melts, the overlying ground can suddenly 
collapse severely damaging or completely destroying anything built on top of it (Alex 2018).  
 
Figure 5: Varying degrees of permafrost extent 
Source: Permafrost Tunnel5 
This phenomenon is significant for military installations since the degradation of military 
infrastructure in Alaska poses a major threat to US Command, Control, Communications, 
                                               
5 http://permafrosttunnel.org/permafrost-in-alaska.html 
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Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Currently, a majority of 
mission critical radar and missile defense stations in Alaska rely on permafrost to stabilize its 
structure and provide access to personnel (see Fig. 6). In addition, 15% of the U.S. Army’s 
training lands are situated in Alaska and the Department of Defense (DoD) has 5 major 
installations in Alaska with a majority of their built infrastructure relying heavily on permafrost 
as a foundation (SERDP 2012). This includes vital cantonment and testing buildings, roadways, 
runways, and other training sites which need continuous subzero temperatures to properly 
operate and maintain structural integrity (Douglas et al. 2016).  
 
Figure 6: Alaskan radar systems locations and extents of permafrost 
Source: Piquniq Management Corporation6 & Permafrost Tunnel7 
In a 2014 study of military installation resilience against climate change, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that “the combination of thawing permafrost, decreasing sea 
ice, and rising sea level on the Alaskan coast have led to an increase in coastal erosion at several 
Air Force radar early warning and communication installations...this erosion has damaged roads, 
utility infrastructure, seawalls, and runways...at one radar early warning installation, 40 feet of 
shoreline has been lost as a result of erosion and the erosion has damaged half of the runway” 
                                               
6 http://www.alaska.net/~pmc/experience/radar.html 
7 http://permafrosttunnel.org/permafrost-in-alaska.html 
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(GAO 2014). In 2007, continuously melting sea ice and coastal erosion caused the foundation of 
3 NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) radar stations in Alaska to 
significantly erode to a point where they were shut down for unstable foundations and budgetary 
restrictions. These radar stations positioned in Alaska were essential for maintaining air 
sovereignty in the Northern Hemisphere since they provide continued surveillance for a majority 
of the Arctic and the Bering Sea (Hughes 2019). Due to the existence of back-up radars 
proximate to the 3 NORAD sites, shutting them down did not have any major consequences on 
radar coverage. Though contingency plans set in place had prevented any significant effects on 
defense and surveillance operations, this was a telling example of how an increasingly warming 
climate in Alaska can directly impact regional military operations (Revkin 2007).  
Maintaining the structural integrity of military installations in Alaska is also vital for 
defense against nuclear and ballistic threats. The geographical location of Alaska makes it 
unparalleled in its ability to monitor and intercept any hostile enemy projectiles coming from the 
Eastern hemisphere. The United States has 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) missiles in its 
arsenal and 40 of them are staged at Fort Greely, Alaska (Holoday 2018). These GBI’s are the 
United States’ primary option for defending against ballistic projectiles and when launched from 
Alaska its trajectory would give it an optimal chance of intercepting Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBM) coming from locations such as Iran or North Korea (Curry 2013). 
 In response to the threat of thawing permafrost, planners and engineers have employed a 
holistic approach which recognizes the uncertainties that will be presented by increasing 
temperatures (SERDP 2012). The military has been proactive in ensuring the continued 
functionality and accessibility of vital Alaskan military infrastructures, a $47 million sea-wall 
project is currently in place to ensure continued access for a remote radar station located just 48 
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miles from the Russian mainland. Additionally, $254 million has already been budgeted by the 
DoD for maintenance and improvement projects in the Alaskan region for the next 5 years 
(Hughes 2019). However, with the the pace of permafrost thawing and coastal erosion, the fiscal 
allocation might not be enough since it cost 18.6% ($47 million) of the total budget to build a 
sea-wall for one runway in 1 of 15 Air Force-managed radar sites. Given that cost of repairs and 
maintenance are often shared with public agencies such as the The Federal Aviation 
Administration, which pays 41% of the costs to maintain the sites, fighting back thawing 
permafrost and coastal erosion is still a costly endeavor. Regardless of who pays for the costs, 
climate driven changes to the Alaskan topography are undeniably causing infrastructural, fiscal, 
and operational burdens for the military.  
This shift towards recognizing climate change as a valid threat in Alaska is vital to the 
adaptability and resilience of future buildings, however, existing infrastructure might be in an 
irreconcilable state since military bases, including several locations in Alaska, are experiencing 
erosion levels that were not expected until 2040 (GAO 2014) and “80% of the infrastructure that 
will exist [in Alaska] in 2050 is already in place” (SERDP 2012). Despite the threats to Alaskan 
infrastructure, its importance in military operations have continually given Congress a reason to 
increase military investments in this remote region. In 2017, Congress approved the military’s 
request for $200 million to field 20 more GBIs to Fort Greely. In the 2019 fiscal year, an 
additional $8 million was approved to add 2 more GBIs (Friedman 2018). The continued 
government investment in anti-missile interceptors is testament to the importance of Alaska’s 
location as a military bulwark against the types of missile threats that the US is anticipated to 
face. 
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 Alaska is also becoming an increasingly pivotal site for regional stability and U.S. 
influence within the adjacent Arctic region which has experienced warming rates approximately 
twice the global average over the past four decades. The anticipated Arctic thawing is projected 
to open up shipping routes between Asia, Europe, and the United States’ East coast, a treasure 
trove containing precious metals & minerals, and up to 30% of the world’s gas reserves 
(Stephenson, Smith, and Agnew 2011; Pezard et al. 2017). In anticipation of this, nations 
surrounding the Arctic region have begun to lay claim on their respective Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ), however, these areas are often overlapping and the United Nations’ Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, the guidebook for establishing EEZs,  has no clear parameters regarding 
these issues  (Stephenson et al. 2013; Forsyth 2018). As resources become more and more 
readily extractable the potential for conflict also rises with it. Competing Arctic and “near-
Arctic” superpowers like Russia and China have expressed growing interest in establishing a 
controlling presence in the region (Bennett 2015). The events that will inevitably transpire within 
the Arctic region is being touted as a ‘litmus test’ to see how geopolitics and military actions will 
respond to an area of contention that is primarily being shaped by climate change (Huebert et al. 
2012).  
In the past 10 years, Russia has significantly ramped up their investments in the Arctic 
region by establishing new military bases and restarting previously dormant ones. These actions 
have resulted in a disproportionate Russian military presence in the Arctic region (see Fig. 7) 
(Forsyth 2018). By 2015, Russia was already deriving 20 percent of its Gross Domestic Product 
from economic activity originating in the Arctic so they have a huge incentive to preserve the 
current unofficial EEZs (Conley and Rohloff 2015). Russia has also begun acting on plans to 
moderate and dominate the projected Northeast Passage, a shipping route directly connecting 
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East Asia with Europe and Eastern U.S. (Stephenson et al. 2013). Since 2016, Russia has 
launched three nuclear icebreakers that are meant to patrol and increase mobility of its assets 
throughout the Arctic Region (Bershidsky 2019). Alaska, being the only US territory with direct 
access to the Arctic, will play a significant role as a counterbalance to Russia in order to ensure 
that EEZ’s are assigned in accordance with internationally agreed upon regulations. That is why 
the degradation of structural integrity and operational capacity of Alaskan military bases will be 
a national security and global stability issue that warrants utmost attention. 
 
Figure 7: Military bases and EEZ claims in the Arctic Circle 
Source: Malte Humpert from The Arctic Institute8 
                                               
8 https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-arctic-shipping/ 
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III. Extreme Weather Events 
Another issue at the intersection of climate change and military operations is the 
increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. There has been a scientific 
consensus that the increased overall intensity and faster intensification rates of hurricanes can be 
attributed to factors that stem from climate change. As “seas warm, the ocean has more energy to 
convert to tropical cyclone wind” resulting in more favorable conditions for the formation and 
intensification of hurricanes (Elsner, Kossin, and Jagger 2008; Knutson et al. 2010; Bhatia et al. 
2018). Different modeling methods and selection of parameters have resulted in varied metrics 
for tracking and measuring hurricane intensification. Some studies predict increases of average 
intensity by 10% if continued warming persists (Knutson et al. 2010), some track superstorm 
occurrences stating that “superstorms with sustained winds over 190 mph are projected to have 
increased occurrence: nine of these storms in a simulation of the late 20th century climate...32 
for the period from 2016 to 2035 and 72 for the period from 2081 to 2100” (Bhatia et al. 2018), 
while others focus on measurable temperature increases concluding that “since 1975 there has 
been a substantial and observable regional and global increase in the proportion of Category 4–5 
hurricanes...per °C of anthropogenic global warming” (Holland and Bruyère 2014). Regardless 
of the metric used for quantifying hurricane intensity, there is a definitive consensus in the 
atmospheric sciences that a warmer climate will increase the intensity of hurricanes. The total 
number of hurricanes might remain stagnant or even decline but there will be an “increase in the 
proportion of intense hurricanes relative to all hurricanes”; a shift from smaller low intensity 
hurricanes to stronger, more destructive category 4 or 5 hurricanes (see Fig. 8) (Knutson et al. 
2010, 2013; Holland and Bruyère 2014; Kang and Elsner 2015; Knutson 2019).  
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Figure 8: Increasing proportion of category 4 and 5 hurricanes 
Source: (Holland and Bruyère 2014) 
In combination with increased frequency and intensity, other climate-change driven 
effects have also been shown to increase the destructive potential of hurricanes. Sea-level rise 
has been shown to extend the range and strength of the storm surge inundating coastal areas 
(Knutson 2019). A warmer atmosphere is capable of holding more moisture which would cause 
hurricane rainfall rates to increase by approximately 20% and making them “up to 15% wetter 
for every 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit of warming” (Knutson et al. 2010, 2013; Knutson 2019). Higher 
precipitation rates during hurricanes increase the likelihood of flooding and infrastructural 
damage to water and electricity grids. Hurricanes can also linger over a specific location for a 
longer period of time since anthropogenic warming has been shown to reduce summer tropical 
circulation responsible for keeping hurricanes moving (Kossin 2018). Concentrating the harmful 
effects of hurricanes on a singular location can increase the chances that hurricane safety 
measures such as reinforced building infrastructures, seawalls, and levees will be overwhelmed.  
A. Tyndall Air Force Base  
Increased hurricane intensities and the destruction that come with them have brought a 
host of problems for critical military bases located in hurricane prone regions. One of the worst 
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examples of hurricane-caused damage to a military base was caused by Hurricane Michael which 
made landfall at Tyndall Air Force Base on October 2018. The gravity of the hurricane’s impact 
on mission critical capabilities and the extent of damage to physical infrastructures have 
highlighted the threat that extreme weather events pose for military operations. Hurricane 
Michael was extremely devastating for two reasons, its overall strength and the the rate in which 
it intensified from a mere tropical depression into a full-strength category-4 hurricane. Hurricane 
Michael, which came with sustained winds of up to 155 miles per hour, tore off hangar roofs and 
hurled debris across Tyndall AFB, resulting in infrastructure damage to 95% of the buildings on 
the base (see Fig. 9) (Spinelli 2018). The primary concern is with regards to the 55 F-22 Raptor 
fighter jets which were stationed on runways and hangars within the base. These jet, which cost 
approximately $150 million each, were a crucial part of the damage estimate since they are a 
vital component to sustaining American airspace dominance and they are nearly irreplaceable 
since their production run ended in 2012 (Sullivan 2009; “Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor” 2019). 
38 F-22 jets were safely flown outside of the base before the hurricane hit while 17 F-22 jets 
were non-mission capable (NMC) when the hurricane made landfall so they were forced to 
shelter in place during the hurricane (Pawlyk 2018). Due to security concerns Air Force officials 
have declined to disclose the exact extent of damage that the jets sustained (see Fig. 10) 
(Achenbach, Begos, and Lamothe 2018). 
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Figure 9: Aftermath of Hurricane Michael on Tyndall AFB 
Source: Scott Olson/Getty Images9 
Hurricane Michael caused extensive damage because it intensified at such an 
unprecedented pace that it gave personnel very limited time to evacuate the base and relocate 
aircraft. According to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David L. Goldfein, “Tyndall’s command 
team had only 48 hours after Michael was upgraded from a tropical storm to a Category 4 
hurricane to get 11,000 people out and evacuate aircraft” (Svan and Egnash 2018). The rapid 
intensification of Hurricane Michael was difficult to predict due to the complexity of factors that 
affect a hurricane’s strength. A wind shear that was expected to slow down Hurricane Michael’s 
rotation dissipated sooner than expected creating a “highly favorable environment” for continued 
                                               
9 https://www.npr.org/2019/02/12/693549647/tyndall-air-force-base-to-be-rebuilt-as-air-base-of-the-future 
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hurricane intensification, “a moist atmosphere and...the water of the Gulf of Mexico [being] two 
or three degrees higher than normal” also aided in the rapid intensification of Hurricane Michael 
(Fleshler 2018). It is difficult to establish direct causation between a warming climate and the 
confluence of events that caused the rapid formation and intensification of Hurricane Michael; 
however, the climate models and projections point to the increase of similar phenomena as the 
atmosphere and oceans continue to warm. 
 
Figure 10: Roofless hangar at Tyndall AFB with rumored F-22 fighter jet in the rubble (upper 
left) 
 Source: (Rogoway 2018) 
B. Offutt Air Force Base 
Aside from direct hurricane damage, the military has also began to experience damaging 
effects from a combination of rare weather anomalies. In mid-March 2019, snowmelt runoff 
from the northern regions, thin layers of ice that made the ground & waterways less permeable 
than usual, and heavy precipitation created a “rare confluence of circumstances” that 
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overwhelmed the natural flow capacity of the Missouri River and resulted in devastating 
widespread flooding across several Midwestern states (see Fig. 11) (Voiland 2019). The flooding 
was further heightened by the presence of an extremely rare ‘bomb cyclone’, a rapidly 
intensifying hurricane that produces “destructive winds, coastal flooding, erosion, and...very 
heavy precipitation” (NOAA 2018; Earl and Schallhorn 2019).  
 
Figure 11: Satellite imagery of the Missouri River before (left) and after (right) the flooding 
event 
Source: NASA Earth Observatory (Voiland 2019) 
The formation and devastating effects of a ‘bomb cyclone’ can be attributed to factors 
symptomatic of climate change. As John Gyakum, one of the people responsible for coining the 
term states, “[a]s the waters warm, they can add more moisture to the air, allowing the storms to 
dump more precipitation...Climate change could also periodically cause cold air to spill farther 
south, and when the two meet, there’s an increased risk for these extreme storms.” (Sanders and 
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Gyakum 1980; Cappucci 2018). Only two U.S. storms were considered "bomb cyclones" in 
2018, but Gyakum projects increased occurence in the future due to warmer ocean temperatures 
and rising sea levels (Cappucci 2018). 
One of the most heavily damaged areas from the Missouri River flooding was Eastern 
Nebraska where Offutt Air Force Base is located. This air force base serves as the central 
headquarters for U.S. Strategic Command and docking point for several mission-critical Air 
Force aircrafts. This military installation received considerable attention due to its importance in 
maintaining national security and from the extensive flooding it experienced.  
Offutt AFB is home to several expensive, mission-critical, and low-density aircraft 
including the entire Air Force arsenal of seventeen RC-135 reconnaissance planes and four E-4B 
“doomsday” airborne command post planes. There have been no exact reports on the condition 
of the aircraft but extensive flooding in approximately one-third of the base’s structures and 40% 
of its main runway would have grounded most if not all aircraft that were left in the base (see 
Fig. 12) (Fedschun 2019). Aside from crucial aircraft, Offutt AFB is also home to U.S. Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) which controls America’s nuclear capabilities. The flooding of roads 
and buildings have made it difficult for personnel to maintain 100% operational capability within 
STRATCOM (USAF 2007; Rogaway 2019). The physical damage caused by the flooding to 
infrastructure and aircraft is detrimental to the Air Force’s operations; however, the 
unquantifiable damage and loss of productivity that resulted from halting almost all maintenance, 
training, and reconnaissance operations can prove to be a bigger threat if these events happened 
during critical times of war or conflict.  
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Figure 12: The main runway and parts of Offutt AFB during the flood 
Source: Colonel Michael Manion Facebook post10 
 
Conclusion: Disconnect Between Military and Politics 
Military leadership is a decisive force when choosing the degree to which climate change 
mitigation efforts are implemented within installations and throughout military operations. 
However, administrative political will might be a better determinant of progress or stagnation of 
climate change adaptation measures. Since President Donald Trump took office in 2017, he has 
implemented measures that have stagnated or retracted climate change adaptation and mitigation 
measures within military bases. The Obama-era Executive Order (EO 13653) that called for the 
production of a Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, a DoD-led climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategy, has been rescinded by President Trump (EO 13783). The same Trump-issued 
Executive Order (EO 13783) also halted the production of the US Army Corp of Engineer’s 
                                               
10 https://www.facebook.com/55.WG.Commander/?__tn__=HHH-R 
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(USACE) Climate Adaptation Plan and Report, an annual assessment of climate-driven risks to 
military installations and an updated list of actions to mitigate these risks (U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers 2015). The primary sustainability imperative within military installations, DoD 
Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, was also promptly halted in 2017 (Department of 
Defense 2016). These actions follow a trend of discontinuations in DoD and USACE studies 
aimed at mitigating and identifying current and future climate change driven effects on military 
installations (see Fig. 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Trend of discontinuations in climate change related DoD studies 
 
In addition to rescinding climate change mitigation focused Executive Orders, the Trump 
administration also dropped all mention of climate change from the most recent National 
Security Strategy (Office of the President 2017). The government’s deprioritization of climate 
change associated risks have begun to significantly alter and potentially mislead military 
installation assessments that are supposed to be objective. The Climate-Related Risk to DoD 
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Infrastructure Initial Vulnerability Assessment Survey (SLVAS) Report’s  first draft,  released in 
December 2016, had 23 instances where ‘climate change’ was mentioned but the final draft 
released in January 2018 had drastically cut down the mentions to just 1 and opted to use terms 
‘extreme weather’ or simply ‘climate’ in some instances (Mooney and Ryan 2018). This shift in 
language is damaging because risks and effects are relegated to unpredictable, sporadic events 
instead of an observed climatic pattern influenced by human actions.  
There is no established connection between the accuracy of reports and political 
predisposition. However, more recent DoD reports have been proven to be insufficient or 
inaccurate at predicting bases that are vulnerable to climate change related risks. For example, 
the 2019 Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense failed to identify 
Offutt AFB within the top 10 most flood prone military bases.  
This has prompted a movement from senior military and national security officials to 
denounce the President’s actions towards deprioritization and undermining of the military and 
scientific community’s findings on climate change. In response to a proposed move by the 
Trump Administration to establish a special committee to refute the general consensus on 
climate change, 58 former senior military and national security officials wrote a letter to 
President Trump urging him to acknowledge the national security implications of climate change 
and arguing that “imposing a political test on reports issued by the science agencies, and forcing 
a blind spot onto the national security assessments that depend on them, will erode our national 
security” (The Center for Climate & Security 2019). 
The Administration’s decision to ignore climate change threats has sent ripples across the 
international community and stalemated major climate focused reforms from being implemented. 
At the beginning of this month, a meeting of Arctic based nations aimed at preserving the region 
concluded without any collective declaration because the United States openly opposed any 
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document that mentioned ‘climate change’. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo acknowledged 
the changes happening in the Arctic as well as the potential dangers and opportunities that would 
present themselves; however, he strategically shied away from addressing climate change as the 
main determinant and accelerator of these changes (Spinelli 2019; Blank 2019).  
The refusal to acknowledge present and future effects of climate change have also caused 
an alarming gap in Arctic power projection between Russia and the United States. Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has recognized the rapidly changing Arctic conditions and he has taken 
steps, such as increasing military presence and launching nuclear icebreakers, to prepare for what 
he believes is an inevitable Arctic future. The U.S. on the other hand has fallen behind in this 
arena since political mandate has oscillated from the Obama Administration recognizing and 
preparing for climate change to the Trump Administration ignoring the threat altogether. This 
politicization of climate change has proven to be detrimental to long-term strategic military 
planning since mitigation and adaptation become exponentially difficult when each subsequent 
administration uses their own political ideology to dictate the actions taken against an apolitical 
and ever-present threat. 
Since political mandate dictates a majority of military actions, the effects of climate 
change on military installations are undeniable and political alignment should not be a hindrance 
to addressing evident problems. As John Conger, former Defense Department deputy 
comptroller, frankly stated, “[w]hen politics affects the debate of what you can and cannot pay 
attention to or everything we do in this space is somehow politicized, it throws a wrench into the 
pragmatic apolitical instincts of the military...The military’s goal is to be pragmatic and 
apolitical” (Werrell and Femia 2017). Based on the evidence presented in this thesis and the 
current geopolitical climate, I contend that the Trump Administration’s denial of climate change 
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will hamper the military’s ability to function at full operational capacity and endanger future 
operations by turning a blind eye to an unavoidable and potentially irreversible threat.   
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